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TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENTS: 
VERIPICATIONISM OR PARASITISM? 
Douglas Ehring 
Recent discussions on the nature of "transcendental" 
arguments have raised the question of whether these 
arguments are in any way distinct or unique. Though 
commentators in general agree that transcendental 
arguments are supposed to refute scepticism, no general 
agreement has been reached as to their distinctiveness. 
Barry Stroud, in his "Transcendental Arguments," 
argues that transcendental arguments rely ultimately on 
some version of the verification principle, and that 
". . . there is nothing special or unique, and nothing 
new, about this way of attacking scepticism."i Several 
rejoinders to Stroud's attack on the uniqueness of the 
transcendental argument have been forthcoming.2 The 
most promising of these defenses of the integrity of 
the transcendental argument has been Rorty's "Verifica-
tionism and Transcendental Arguments." Rorty argues 
that the so-called transcendental arguments which 
Stroud examines are not "good" examples of this sort 
of argument. Rorty contends "that the only good 
'transcendental* argument is a 'parasitism* argument."3 
A "parasitism" argument is supposed to escape the 
Stroudian attack. According bo Rorty, Stroud's 
appraisal is effective against those versions of the 
transcendental argument which seek to "prove necessary 
existence." The "parasitism" argument refutes the 
sceptic not by trying to prove that material objects 
must exist, but by demonstrating that the sceptic's 
new way of describing the world in terms of "experiences," 
say, is not possible without the use of "material 
object" concepts. In other words, the "parasitism" 
argument seeks to show that the sceptic's alternative 
conceptual scheme is incapable of providing descrip-
tions of "everything vre now describe in terms of 
e.g. persons and material objects . . . in terms of 
experiences."4 
The thesis of this paper is that even the "para-
sitism" argument against the sceptic, when correctly 
understood, is subject to the Stroudian attack. In 
order to prove this thesis it is necessary to show 
that Rorty misunderstands the strategy of the sceptic 
and, consequently, that of the transcendental argument 
considered as a "parasitism" argument. I will show how 
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the "parasitism" argument must ultimately rely on an 
application of the verification principle, in some 
form, to complete its argument against the sceptic. 
Before examining Rorty's defense in detail we 
must look at the particulars of Stroud's attack. 
According to Stroud, a transcendental argument is 
supposed to demonstrate the "impossibility or ille-
gitimacy of the sceptical challenge by proving that 
certain concepts are necessary for thought or ex-
perience."5 The sceptic challenges our belief in 
the existence of an external world; the sceptic 
maintains "that there is . . . a world of material 
objects at all is a contingent fact, and . . . chal-
lenges us to show how we know it."6 The transcen-
dental argument is said to prove that "material 
object" concepts are necessary to any experience or 
thought at all. By such a demonstration/ the 
sceptic's challenge, which must rely on some ex-
perience or thought, is shown to be illegitimate. 
With this general formula in mind, Stroud examines 
two different ways in which this notion of a transcen-
dental argument might be given sense. 
For the sake of this paper I will call these 
two renderings of the transcendental argument the 
Meaning Approach and the Speech-Act Approach.' Both 
of these interpretations agree on the fact that a 
transcendental argument argues for the proposition 
doubted by the sceptic by trying to demonstrate that 
this proposition is a necessary condition of the 
sceptic's making sense, and that, therefore, the 
sceptic's doubt is illegitimate. The Meaning Approach 
holds that a transcendental argument is supposed to 
prove that the conclusion of the argument, doubted 
by the sceptic, is a necessary condition of our 
conceptual scheme which, in some sense, forms the 
premises of the argument. The sceptic's doubt is 
shown to make no sense since it would involve doubting 
a necessary condition of the only conceptual scheme 
in which that doubt could make sense. The Speech-Act 
Approach contends that a transcendental argument is 
intended to demonstrate that the proposition doubted 
by the sceptic is a necessary condition of the sceptic's 
act of assertion or supposal. Consequently the sceptic 
doubb is shown to make no sense if asserted or supposed. 
In other words, the sceptic's is shown to make no sense 
by proving that the speech-act through which he 
formulates his doubt entails the proposition that is 
the object of his doubt. Stroud argues that both of 
these types of arguments rely on the verification 
principle and are, therefore, not distinct argument 
forms. 
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Meaning Approach 
A transcendental argument according to the 
Meaning Approach, as we have seen, is supposed to 
demonstrate that the truth of the proposition doubted 
by the sceptic is a necessary condition of our con-
ceptual scheme, of our making sense, and that, there-
fore, the sceptic's doubt is simple nonsense. The 
argument is thus meant to be a proof that the sceptic's 
doubt somehow involves an incoherency and, therefore, 
is illegitimate. Stroud analyzes an argument of this 
form from the first half of Strawson's Individuals and 
shows it to involve an application of some version of 
the verification principle. 
Stroud's analysis of Strawson's argument can be 
paraphrased in these terms: Strawson posits that to 
talk meaningfully requires that we talk within the 
bounds of our conceptual scheme. Strawson argues 
that the proposition ("objects continue to exist 
unperceived") doubted by the sceptic is entailed by 
our conceptual scheme. If the proposition is so 
implied then the sceptic's doubts "amount to a re-
jection of the . . . conceptual scheme within which 
alone such doubts make sense. " 8 Consequently his 
doubt cannot make sense. Stroud finds this argument 
to rest on an application of the verification principle. 
With the aid of this principle, the move from our 
conceptual scheme to the proposition about the world 
is made possible. However, by using this principle, 
the need for a "transcendental" argument, as something 
more than or distinct from an application of the 
principle, is superseded. In other words, if the 
sceptic's claim that we cannot know if the proposition 
is true or false is meaningful then his claim must be 
false by the principle invoked that: 
. . . if the notion of objective particulars 
makes sense to us, we can sometimes know certain 
conditions to be fulfilled, the fulfillment of 
which logically implies either that objects 
continue to exist unperceived or they do not.9 
Consequently the "transcendental" argument can no longer be considered distinctive. 
Let us look at Stroud's critique in more detail. 
Strawson's argument is meant to show that the sceptic 
makes no sense. He begins by premising the following 
as true of our conceptual scheme: 
(1) We think of the world as containing objective particulars in a single spatiotemporal system.10 
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The truth of the proposition doubted by the sceptic 
will be shown to be a necessary condition of our 
conceptual scheine, which includes (1), and thus the 
sceptic's doubt will be shown to make no sense because 
it will involve/ as we have said, a rejection of the 
necessary conditions of the existence of the conceptual 
scheme within which alone such doubts make sense. 
The sceptic is taken as doubting or denying: 
"(6) Objects continue to exist unperceived." Strawson 
must show that (6) is a necessary condition of our 
conceptual scheme which includes (1)• Strawson admits 
two more "necessary truths" of our conceptual scheme, 
according to Stroud: 
(2) If we think of the world as containing 
objective particulars in a single spatiotemporal 
system, then we are able to identify and reidentify 
particulars; 
(3) If we can reidentify particulars, then we 
must have a satisfiable criteria on the basis 
of which we can make reidentifications.ü 
Strawson's argument is said to stop here. But Strawson 
has shown at most that "if the sceptic's statements 
make sense then we must have satisfiable criteria on 
the basis of which we can reidentify a presently 
observed object as numerically the same as one ob" 
served earlier . . . . " 1 2 The sceptic can still 
claim that it may be possible that all our reidentifica-
tions asserted on such a basis are false. 
A principle that would explicitly rule out this 
alleged possibility would be: 
(4) If we know that the best criteria for re-
identification have been satisfied, then we know 
that objects continue to exist unperceived.13 
However, as Stroud points out, the conjunction (1 to 4) 
is a verification principle: 
. . . if the notion of objective particulars makes 
sense to me then we can sometimes know certain 
conditions to be fulfilled, the fulfillment of 
which logically implies either that objects 
continue to exist unperceived or they do not.1'* 
Though this principle is necessary to derive (6) , it is 
not sufficient. However, this principle in and of 
itself is sufficient to refute the sceptic who claims 
that it is not possible to know if objective particulars 
continue to exist unperceived. "If the sceptic's 
claim makes sense it must be false, since if the 
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proposition could not be known to be true or false 
it would make no sense."15 
However, in order to fulfill the original plan of 
deriving (6) one further premise is required: "We 
sometimes know that the best criteria we have for re-
identification of particulars have been satisfied."16 
Unfortunately, though (6) can now be deduced, Strawson's 
objective of defeating the sceptic by showing that he 
made no sense simply on the basis of our conceptual 
scheme cannot be accomplished. The game is lost 
because (S) is a factual premise not about the way we 
think or our conceptual scheme. If (6) were a con-
sequence of statements only about our conceptual 
scheme, without recourse to other factual premises, 
then the sceptic would be shown to be doubting a 
necessary condition of the fundamentals of our con-
ceptual scheme. Since the doubt or denial of (6) does 
not involve the rejection of our conceptual scheme 
alone, the sceptic may be making sense after all. 
Stroud argues that the move to (5) is not only 
self-defeating but made unnecessary by the addition of 
(4). The move to step (5) was to be the final stage of 
the "transcendental" argument. With the conjunction 
of (1 to 4} the sceptic is refuted directly by a 
verification principle, if the principle is to be 
accepted as valid. Consequently, since (4) is necessary 
to the success of the argument, the "transcendental" 
argument must ultimately rely on a verification 
principle. Furthermore, with the addition of (4) 
the fifth premise becomes superfluous. Without the 
introduction of the verification principle Strawson's 
argument would have no bite, and with it the rest of 
Strawson's argument, i.e., the step (5) necessary to 
complete the argument as "transcendental," becomes 
needless. 
The sceptic is thus directly refuted by the 
verification principle invoked, and "there is no need 
to go through an indirect or transcendental argument 
to expose his mistakes.n17 Stroud, later on in his 
article, goes back on this claim "that the sceptic is 
directly refuted by anyone who accepts (the principle], 
because it would be open to the sceptic to deny that 
we understand the notion of objective particulars."18 
The sceptic may just concede the legitimacy of the 
verification principle, and, thus, that (P) "Objects 
continue to exist unperceived" makes no sense: 
. . . the sceptic might accept this with equa-
nimity. Of course statements about objective 
particulars are hypotheses which 'transcend 
all possible experience,' How could such an 
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hypothesis be backed by meaning?19 
The sceptic himself could be said to make no sense 
if and only if he asserted both "P is meaningful" and 
"p cannot be known to be true or false." By the 
verification principle this combined assertion is non-
sensical. But the sceptic is not forced to say that 
"P is meaningful." He can say only that "P cannot be 
known to be true or false." A refutation by the 
verification principle of this proposition would 
require that saying this would imply "P is meaningful.u 
But/ as we have said, the sceptic need not commit 
himself to this implication. An example of the same 
sort of statement being made by a non-sceptical 
upholder of the principle might be that (X) "'Angels 
exist' cannot be known to be true or false." Certainly 
by the verification principle it might be maintained 
that while "Angels exist" is meaningless, (X) is not 
nonsense. The verification principle does not jeop-
ardize the sceptic's doubt if his doubt has the same 
form as the above. In other words, in order to insure 
his position the sceptic need admit only that the 
proposition (P) is meaningless: 
. . . it is always open to the sceptic to accept 
the argument and conclude that talk about, say, 
the continued existence of unperceived objects 
really doesn't make sense to us . . . . Far 
from refuting scepticism this would make it 
stronger. Not only would we be unable to know 
whether the proposition allegedly expressed by 
a certain form of words is true we would not even 
understand those words.19' 
As Stine says, this "possibility is what led Stroud to 
formulate his less restricted version of a transcen-
dental argument."20 This less restricted version 
interprets the "transcendental" argument in terms of 
the conditions of anything being asserted or supposed, 
that is of being able to talk about anything at all. 
Speech-Act Approach 
The use of the term Speech-Act in connection 
with transcendental arguments was initiated by Gram 
in his "Transcendental Arguments."21 A Speech-Act 
account holds that: 
A transcendental argument would establish that certain propositions are true just because the assertion or supposal of the negations of such propositions contradict a necessary condition of certain types of speech-acts.22 
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A transcendental argument would prove that a propo-
sition P is true just because the assertion or supposal 
of its negation contradicts a necessary condition of 
the kind of speech-act that is required to assert or 
suppose not-P. 
An example of this sort of argument might assume 
that the existence of persons is a necessary condition for such speech-acts as asserting or supposing. It 
might assume further that the proposition that there 
are no persons implies the non-existence of these 
speech-acts. "If propositions like the foregoing are 
supposed or asserted to be true, it follows that they 
are false."23 
Stroud's less restricted version of the transcen-
dental argument may be understood in terms of the 
Speech-Act approach. Stroud defines a transcendental 
argument as an argument which "proves that the truth 
of its conclusion is a necessary condition of there 
being any experience or thought at all."23 Stroud 
specifies this statement in terms of the notion of a 
proof that S is a necessary condition of there being 
some language. With this specification it is possible 
to formulate the argument in Speed.-Act terms: 
If we had such a proof we would know that S cannot 
be denied truly, that there is some language. 
The existence of language is a necessary condition 
of anyone's even asserting or denying anything at 
all.2* 
The propositions proved by transcendental arguments 
would be those "which must be true in order for there 
to be any language, and which consequently cannot be 
denied by anyone."25 The speech-act of denying or 
asserting S would entail the existence of language 
and, therefore, the truth of S: " . . . the truth of S 
follows from the fact that someone asserted or denied 
it, or said anything at all." These sorts of 
propositions are said to belong to the "Privileged 
class." 
Obviously, on this model, the significant issue is 
whether or not a proposition S might be shown to be 
a member of the "privileged class." Stroud argues that 
any such attempted demonstration, which appealed to 
"language in general" or "the possibility of making 
sense," could not show conclusively that S was a 
member. The reason that such a proof is impossible is 
that the sceptic could always insist that for any 
candidate S, proposed as a member, "it is enough to 
make language possible if we believe that S is true, or 
if it looks for all the world as if it is, but that S 
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needn't actually be true.'"'0 It is enough that we 
have tliis belief for us to give sense to what we say, 
"but some additional justification would still 
have to be given for our claim to know that S is 
true."27 
This "additional justification" must be, 
according to Stroud, the verification principle 
that it is not possible for anything to make sense 
unless it is possible for us to establish whether S 
is true. "In other words, the meaning of a statement 
would have to be determined by what we know."28 
However, with such a principle, the sceptic can be 
directly refuted. The sceptic's counter that it is 
enough that we believe S to be true to make language 
possible is directly refuted by this principle which 
disallows the possibility that we "know only what 
conditions make it look for all the world as if S is 
true, but which are still compatible with S's falsity."29 
The second stage of the "transcendental" argument, in 
which assertion of not-S was to prove that s was true 
because it is a necessary condition of any assertion, 
becomes unnecessary. The sceptic's claim is essentially 
that it is impossible to know if a certain proposition 
S is true or false. The sceptic's claim is directly 
refuted by the principle. Consequently, 
. . . even when we deal in general with the 
necessary conditions of there being any language 
at all, it looks as if the use of a so-called 
"transcendental" argument to demonstrate the 
self-defeating character of scepticism would 
amount to nothing more and nothing less than 
an application of some version of the verifica-
tion principle, and if this is what a transcen-
dental argument is there is nothing special or 
unique, and certainly nothing new, about this 
way of attacking scepticism.30 
Stroud's analysis shows that the "transcendental" 
argument of the Speech-Act type is not a distinct 
argument form. 
Rejoinder to Stroud 
The move to a "parasitism" theory of transcendental 
arguments is motivated by several failings that seem 
to be evident in Stroud's picture of the transcendental 
argument and the sceptic. Hacker, in his "Are Trans-
cendental Arguments a Version of Verificationism," 
takes up this two pronged rejoinder to Stroud.31 
The "parasitism" approach will be seen to develop out 
of these criticisms and reach a fuller form in Rorty's 
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"Verificationism and Transcendental Arguments."32 
Hacker first establishes that Stroud misunderstood 
the nature of the sceptical challenge. Stroud contends 
that the sceptic doubts or denies our knowledge of an 
independent, external world. This statement of the 
sceptic's position fails by omission. Stroud forgets 
to note that the sceptic, to whom the transcendental 
argument is meant to speak, also admits that we have 
knowledge of our mind's contents—thoughts. The 
Cartesian sceptic will allow that certain claims to 
know our own beliefs, etc., are incorrigible. Stroud's 
treatment of the transcendental argument makes no 
mention of this tenet of the scepticism under attack. 
The sceptic of the Meaning approach, for instance, 
doubts or denies that "objects continue to exist un-
perceived," but makes no claims to know his own inner 
states. 
The significance of this omission will become 
visible only when the second prong of the rejoinder is 
clarified. Hacker argues that the strategy of the 
transcendental argument is neither to show that the 
sceptic's doubt is nonsensical because it rejects our 
conceptual scheme nor because it involves the denial 
of a necessary condition of language. Rather the 
transcendental argument is supposed to show that the 
sceptic cannot legitimately in one statement claim • 
inner knowledge and in the next deny outer knowledge: 
inner knowledge is not possible without outer knowledge. 
The basic strategy of this argument will be to show 
that one set of concepts (inner) is "parasitic" on 
another set (outer). We will return to the details 
of this sort of argument in our treatment of Rorty. 
For now we can see that the verificationist 
argument is different from the transcendental argument 
according to this model. The verificationist argues 
that: 
The falsity of the sceptic's claim that it is 
impossible in principle to know whether or not 
statements about objective particulars are true 
or false is a necessary condition of the meaning-
fulness of such statements, and hence a necessary 
condition of the claim making sense.33 
In other words, the falsity of the sceptic's claim is a 
necessary condition of its meaningfulnesa. Whether or 
not this sort of argument really touches the sceptic 
is not presently at issue. In a transcendental 
argument a different strategy is adopted: 
. . . if the sceptic's claim is true, then his 
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other claims, namely to know how things seem to 
him to be, are thereby made meaningless. The 
sceptic . . . cannot both affirm and deny that he 
knows the nature of his own inner experiences and 
simultaneously deny . . • his knowledge of his 
inner experiences is ever sufficiently good evidence 
to enable him to know how things actually are. 3 4 
The drift of this version of the transcendental argument 
is that the sceptic cannot legitimately maintain both 
his sceptical stance on external objects and his claim 
to know his own inner states. The difference between 
this sort of argument and the other two is that the 
meaningfulness of the sceptic's doubt is judged in 
relation to his other knowledge claims. In the 
previous two theories the sceptic's doubt was supposed 
to be shown to be meaningless in relation to our 
conceptual scheme or language in general. This 
latest version argues that the sceptic's doubt is not 
meaningless simply with respect to certain general 
conditions, but that it involves him in incoherency 
with respect to his other claims. 
Thus (lacker's general reply to both approaches 
is that they misconstrue the strategy of the trans-
cendental argument. On these models one would have to 
establish that the truth of S is a necessary condition 
of "making any sense at all" or "saying anything at 
all." In other words it would not be enough to show 
that the truth of S was necessary to some subset of 
concepts or language, but that S was necessary to 
language in general, for instance. "Furthermore, as 
we have seen, the task of showing that the truth of 
S is necessary to any language, in the case of the 
Speech-Act approach, cannot be accomplished without 
some version of the verification principle. Without 
this principle, the most we could show is that the 
belief that S is true is necessary to any language. 
Hacker's point is that the transcendental argument 
does not pretend to succeed at that task. 
According to the "parasitism" approach, a 
transcendental argument is supposed to show that if 
we are to use certain concepts we must use certain 
other ones. In other words, if we are to make sense 
in one way we must make sense in another. In terms 
of our example, the use of "inner" concepts is said 
to require the use of "outer" concepts. Since the 
sceptic claims one set of concepts to be "objectively 
valid," a "parasitism" argument might show that if 
this is the case then another set of concepts must 
also have a use. To refute the sceptic we have to 
show that his use of inner concepts is not possible 
without outer concepts. The task of showing the 
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above is not the same as showing that the sceptic's 
denial or doubt of the external world is self-defeating 
because the use of any concept or language presupposes, 
in some sense, the existence of the external world. 
On the "parasitism" model, the point of the transcen-
dental argument is that the use of certain particular 
concepts is a necessary condition of the use of certain 
other particular concepts. '.The verification principle 
is called into service, in Stroud's article, only 
when it becomes necessary to show that the truth of 
S is necessary to the existence of any language, for 
instance. Since no such task confronts the transcen-
dental argument Stroud's claims seem to be surpassed. 
Rorty*s Defense; "Parasitism" 
Rorty makes the point, in his "Verificationism 
and Transcendental Arguments," that what the above 
line of interpretation comes down to is that the only 
good "transcendental" argument is a "parasitism" 
argument. According to Rorty the "parasitism" argument 
says to the sceptic: 
If you merely say that all the reasons we have 
for thinking such-and-such' s to exist or to be 
impossible might be insufficient, you cannot be 
refuted. All that you have done then is to say 
that, in metaphysics as in physics, it is always 
possible for a better idea to come along which 
will give a better way of describing the world 
than in terms of what wa thought must necessarily 
exist or which we previously thought impossible. 
We can only catch you out if you purport to actually 
advance such a better idea. Then we may be able 
to show that your new way of describing the world 
would not be intelligible to someone who was not 
familiar with the old way, 3 5 
According to this interpretation, the sceptic who 
claims that there is the possibility that our presently 
held reasons for believing in the existence of the 
external world, say, might not be adequate cannot be 
refuted. However, the sceptic of the transcendental 
argument claims more. He says, for instance in the 
case of the Cartesian sceptic, that everything we 
describe in terras of physical objects can be described 
in terms of inner experience. A conceptual alternative 
is presented. The force of a transcendental will be 
in showing that the alternative concepts are "parasitic" 
on the old scheme which, in this case, includes physical 
object concepts. 
From the above it is obvious that the structure 
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of the argument is such that it could only work if 
the sceptic claims to have an alternative way of 
describing the world. Rorty*s familiar example is 
the sceptic who says that the alternative conceptual 
scheme would include only "pure-experience0 concepts. 
According to Rorty, the "parasitism" argument against 
such a sceptic does not depend, as the previous 
two have, on whether or not the "old way" is true or 
just believed to be true. 
Thus a "parasitism" argument demonstrates that 
one set of concepts is "parasitic" on another set. 
An example of this sort of argument can be found in 
Rorty*s "Strawson's Objectivity Argument."36 Rorty's 
argument is couched in terms of an interpretation of 
what Strawson calls Kant's argument for the "objec-
tivity thesis," found in the "Transcendental Deduc-
tion" of the Critique of Pure Reason. The sceptic 
of the argument claims-that "sense-datum" experience 
is possible. "Sense-datum" experience is defined as 
the experience of a subject who does not have "physical-
object" concepts in his repertoire. The "objects" of 
such experiences "might be the sort which the early 
sense-datum theorist spoke of—red, round patches, 
oblongs . . . ,"3' A "table" in this alternative 
conceptual scheme would be better described in terms 
of various collections of "sense-data" such as "hard" 
and "smooth," etc. Thus the possibility of an alterna-
tive conceptual scheme in which only sensory quality 
concepts are used is posited. Rorty's "parasitism" 
argument, in this case, is .that these sorts of concepts 
are "parasitic" on "physical-object" concepts, i.e., 
the use of only sensory quality concepts is impossible. 
Rorty*s argument premises the thesis of the 
"conceptualizability of experience:" the thesis that 
all experience involves the recognition of particular 
items as being of such and such a general nature or 
kind. This premise means that all experience involves 
the use of concepts to make a judgment, which in turn 
involves having a thought expressible, in a sentence. 
The core of the "parasitism" argument, in this case, is 
that ". . . if all one has are names for sensory 
qualities, one will not be able to construct sentences." 
No sentences can be constructed with only adjectives 
such as "red" and "hard." Substantives, as well as 
adjectives, are necessary for the construction of 
sentences. Since any experience requires the use of 
concepts and since the use of concepts requires the 
use of substantives, "sense-datum" experience, which 
has only adjectival concepts, is not possible. 
Rorty*s argument continues further to try to show that 
the only candidates for these substantive concepts 
are "physical-object" concepts. 
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Though a rauch more detailed examination of this 
argument would be required to assess its validity, the 
general strategy of the "parasitism" argument is well 
illustrated. The sceptic says that a certain set of 
concepts, sensory quality concepts, can serve the 
function of describing the world. The argument 
counters this claim by showing that the use of sensory 
quality concepts is only possible if there is a use 
for Mphysical-object" concepts. 
Rorty*s Mistake 
Rorty*s defense of the transcendental argument 
from Stroud's attack is based on two misconceptions. 
The first is Rorty's drastically misleading picture 
of the sceptic. According to Rorty, the sceptic 
offers an alternative conceptual scheme for describing 
the world. The sceptic is not so much interested in 
putting into question certain knowledge claims, but 
rather is interested in defending a few of his own. 
His position, which Rorty finds analogous to that of 
a scientist or metaphysician proffering a new hypo-
thesis or belief, is that every thing we now describe 
in material object terras is better described in 
"pure-experience" terms. The general drift of this 
program is Phenomenalism. Phenomenalism, in its 
linguistic form, claims that the concept of "material 
object" can be defined in terms of private sensa (in 
tliis case in "pure-experience" terms) . The Phenomenal-
ist seeks to provide translations of statements about 
material objects into equivalent sets of statements 
about "pure-experiences." What is really meant by 
talk about such things as rocks, houses, and hats can 
be expressed solely in terms of "pure experiences," 
In other words, statements about "physical objects" 
and statements about "pure-experiences" are different 
ways of describing the same state of affairs, which 
ultimately must be identified with "pure-experiences." 
The "physical object" is a logical construct based on 
the patterns and configurations that hold between 
various "pure-experiences." The sceptic, on RortyTs 
model, takes up this program of translation. This 
identification of the sceptic with the Phenomenal!st 
is unfortunate. The sceptic, in fact, follows a 
different tact. He does not argue that "physical 
object" statements are translatable into "pure-ex-
perience" statements, but that though the latter can 
provide knowledge the former cannot. The sceptic 
doubts the legitimacy of our use of "physical object" 
concepts. His interest is in raising the question 
of their validity and not in providing the answer. 
Rorty's first misconception is thus in mistaking 
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the sceptic for the Phenomenalist. Indeed the sceptic 
does claim that certain sorts of concepts have an 
epistemological primacy, but this is distinct from the 
descriptive primacy claimed by the Phenomenal ist for 
a phenomenal*language. The former thesis is that 
knowledge claims about my "experiences" are more 
reliable than knowledge claims about "physical objects." 
This epistemological primacy of knowledge claims under 
certain descriptions does not involve the second thesis 
that these sorts of descriptions describe better what 
is described in "physical object" terms. 
Indeed, Rorty*s first misconception runs even 
deeper than thus far indicated. Rorty argues that the 
sceptic is either a Phenomenalist or his scepticism is 
based on the following consideration: the external 
world's existence is open to doubt because "it is 
always possible for a better idea to come along which 
will give a better way of describing the world . . . €"-»9 According to Rorty, if the sceptic is arguing from the 
possibility of future conceptual change then he cannot 
be refuted. The sceptic must present some alternative 
way of describing the world or else he remains unrefuted. 
Rorty's "either-or" picture, however, fails on both 
counts. First of all, as we have seen, the sceptic 
is not a Phenomenalist. Secondly, the sceptic does 
not base his doubt on the above possibility. The 
sceptic does not claim that belief in the external 
world's existence is, as it is in Rorty's picture, a 
belief of the same order as other scientific and meta-
physical beliefs that are subject to change. In terms 
of the analogy with scientific beliefs, the sceptic 
willingly admits that this belief is not subject to 
empirical confirmation or discontinuation. Belief in 
the external world's existence is, in some sense, the 
"foundation" upon which rests our other empirical 
beliefs: 
As long as we have a public object world of 
material objects in space and time to rely on, 
particular questions about how we know that 
such-and-such is the case can eventually be 
settled. But that there is such a world of 
material objects at all is a matter of contingent 
fact, and the sceptic challenges us to show how we 
know it. 4 0 
Unlike empirical beliefs the sceptic claims that there 
is no possible justification for our claim to know 
that the external world exists. Normally we justify 
our knowledge claims on the basis of various sorts of 
empirical evidence and the like. In this case such 
appeals to matters of fact are illegitimate. 
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The second misconception, Rorty's view of the 
transcendental argument as a "parasitism" argument 
pure and simple, grows out of his mistaken conception 
of scepticism. If, indeed, the sceptic did claim 
that an alternative conceptual scheme was available 
for describing the world more accurately, then the 
transcendental argument would be best construed as a 
"parasitism" argument, an argument to the effect that 
the alternative is not able to "live on its own" 
without the "older" system. The argument, in fact, 
would then be as straightforward as Rorty's argument 
against "sense-datum" experience. But the sceptic 
does not present this straw man position. The sceptic's 
position is such that even if it could be shown that 
the use of "pure-experience" concepts is not possible 
without the use of "physical object" concepts, the 
challenge of the sceptic would go unanswered. 
Before examining this claim more closely, a dis-
tinction must be made between two senses of the 
"correct use of an expression." One sense of knowing 
how to correctly use an expression requires that we 
know the situations in which it is appropriate and those 
in which it is inappropriate to apply words of a 
certain class. The second sense of correctly using an 
expression requires that we use it truly in those 
situations which are appropriate. I will call correct 
in the first sense, correctx and in the second sense, 
correct2. Now it can be readily seen that the correct^ 
use of an expression does not imply the correct2, or true, use of an expression. Consider, for example, 
a person who is hypnotised so that he will feel no 
pain when stuck with a pin. In this situation it is 
surely appropriate for someone who sees the person 
being stuck, but does not know he is hypnotised, to 
claim that the person is experiencing pain, and thereby 
use the expression "pain." Iiis claim in this situation 
is false though appropriate.41 On the other hand, 
the corrects use of "inner experience" concepts requires 
the use of "physical object" concepts. So far this 
argument has not specified if the latter usage must 
also be correct2. In fact the "parasitism" argument as far as it goes cannot so specify. The most that can 
be shown by this sort of argument is that the correct, 
use of a conaept requires the correct}, use of another. 
The reason for this limitation is based on the limits 
of the argument: a concept's meaning, though not its 
legitimacy, is shown to be dependent on the meaning of 
another concept. In the example above, Rorty tried to 
demonstrate that the use or meaning of sensory quality 
concepts required the use or meaning of "physical 
object" concepts, and nob that the correct2 use of 
the former required the correct2 u a ^ °f the latter. 
Consequently, it is clear that as far as the "parasitism" 
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argument goes, in Rorty's model, the sceptic remains 
unrefuted. 
The sceptic's doubt can only be shown to be 
illegitimate by a "parasitism" argument which could 
demonstrate that the correct2 use of certain concepts 
requires the correct2 use of other sorts of concepts. 
In fact the most the "parasitism" argument so far 
examined can show is that the cor recti u s e °* certain 
concepts requires the correct^ use of others. In order 
to prove otherwise some version of the verification 
principle would be necessary: the principle that the 
meaning of certain concepts requires that it be 
possible for us to know whether they are truly or 
falsely applied. The meaning of statements about 
certain concepts would have to be determined by what 
we can know. In other words, the correct2 use of 
concept A requires the correct1 use of concept B, 
which in turn requires that it be possible for us to 
know if B's exist. 
Without some such principle, it is always open 
to the sceptic to insist that it is enough to make 
possible the use of the first concept if we believe 
that the second can be applied correctly2# "or if it 
looks for all the world as if it is, but that it needn't 
be true."'*2 Rorty's "parasitism" argument makes no 
real use of the fact that the use of inner concepts, 
say, is accepted as legitimate by the sceptic. The 
"parasitism" argument simply says that the meaning of 
these concepts depends on the meaning of "physical 
object" concepts. In order to show that the latter 
are legitimate, some version of the verification 
principle must be invoked: the conditions of these 
inner concepts making sense have to be "strong enough 
to include not only our beliefs" about physical 
objects "but also the possibility of knowing whether 
these beliefs are true: hence the meaning of a 
statement would have to be determined by what we 
know."43 
Let us call a necessary condition of the use of 
a concept "A," "P." The "parasitism" argument can 
establish that the meaning of statements about "A" 
is dependent on statements about some other concept 
"0" making sense. In order to establish that the 
sceptic's doubt of the existence of O's is illegiti-
mate, it must be shown that "P" includes the possibility 
of knowing if O's exist. But in order to show the 
latter some further argument is necessary. If, for 
instance, it were argued that the concept "non-
unicorns" was "parasitic" on the concept of "unicorns," 
that in itself would not show that it is possible to 
know if unicorns exist, even though we may know that 
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non-unicorns exist. Thus if dP" is to include a claim 
which refutes the sceptic's doubt that claim must 
either be the verification principle or a factual claim 
derivable only through the use of a verification 
principle, thus making the claim superfluous. But as 
Stroud says "to prove this would be to prove some 
version of the verification principle, and then the 
sceptic will have been directly and conclusively 
refuted."44 consequently, there would be no reason to 
attribute any distinctive status to the "transcendental" 
argument. 
At the beginning of this paper it was said that 
the "parasitism" argument has the advantage of not 
arguing for necessary existence. We have also seen 
that this argument works only against the Phenoraenalist, 
or someone who proposes to replace one conceptual 
scheme with another. The sceptic denies that the use 
of "physical object" concepts can be justified. This 
challenge consists in claiming that such objects 
cannot be proved to exist. The sceptic demands a 
proof of their "necessary existence." We have seen 
that the verification principle provides the vital 
link between meaning and the world necessary to 
refute the sceptic. Through some version of this 
principle it is shown that it is impossible for all 
our criteria to be fulfilled and it still be the case 
that these objects do not exist. This latter 
consequence follows from the verification principle 
under question: it is not possible for one set of 
concepts to make sense unless it is possible for us to 
establish whether some statements containing concepts 
from another set are true, in other words, as we have 
just said, it is not possible for us to understand 
statements containing the former concepts if we know 
only what conditions make it look for all the world 
as if statements containing the latter were true, but 
were still compatible with the falsity of these latter 
statements. However, as Stroud makes clear, though 
the verification principle would be necessary to com-
plete any argument for "necessary existence," its 
adoption directly refutes the sceptic and makes un-
necessary any move to argue ntranscendentally." 
The sceptic is refuted "directly" in the sense that 
it is not necessary actually to prove "necessary 
existence." The fact that the sceptic admits the 
legitimacy of one set of concepts along with the 
acceptance of the principle is sufficient to refute 
the sceptic who claims that it is not possible to know 
if statements containing concepts of the second set 
are true. 
The whole force of the "parasitism" argument is based on the notion that the meaningful use of certain 
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concepts is not possible unless these concepts bear 
some non-trivial "inferential relations" with other 
concepts. This is the meaning-in-use slogan according 
to Rorty. However, this notion does not provide an 
adequate reply to the non-Phenomenalist sceptic. The 
sceptic will admit that certain uses may require certain 
others, but demands that these latter uses be justified. 
Such justification is not possible by the "parasitism" 
argument alone. Unless some stronger principle is 
invoked the sceptic remains unanswered. This further 
principle could only be that statements about "X's," 
concepts of the second set, make sense only if we are 
able to state criteria the fulfillment of which 
logically implies that X's exist. 
As Stroud says, if this analysis of the transcen-
dental arguments holds we are not so far as we might 
think from Vienna in the 1920's. The attempt to 
defend the integrity of the transcendental argument 
against this analysis has failed to show this argument 
to stand without a verification principle. Indeed, 
we have seen that the "parasitism" version of the 
transcendental argument must ultimately rely on an 
application of some such principle. Rorty has thus 
not shown the "transcendental" argument to have a 
distinctive form. 
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